U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1982 to 1990 failed to prevent the eruption of the Gulf War. The policy failed because it was flawed in both its concept and execution, as both the Reagan and Bush administrations misplayed their power-politics strategies, according to Bruce Jentleson, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis, and director of the UC Davis Washington Center. In his new book, "With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990," Jentleson states that few U.S. foreign policy strategies have gone so far awry as the decision to support Iraq leader Saddam Hussein throughout the 1980s. Following the principle that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," the Reagan administration first tilted toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. This same thinking continued and even deepened during the Bush administration, right up to the eve of Hussein's invasion of Kuwait -- when the "enemy of my enemy proved that he could still be my enemy, too." Jentleson's book draws on hundreds of declassified documents, numerous interviews, congressional hearings and scores of other sources to show how and why the Reagan-Bush strategy of bringing Hussein into "the family of nations" failed. Why didn't Hussein change his ways? Why didn't the United States increase its influence? Jentleson's answers to these questions push beyond the revelations of the "Iran-gate" scandal to get at the most fundamental flaws in the Reagan-Bush strategy. His research and analysis document that, "far from the '20/20 hindsight' defense mounted by President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker and others," there was a pattern of warnings over many years about Hussein's actions, acquisitions and intentions. Well before Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, there were plenty of reasons to question whether "this enemy of my enemy" had become much of a friend. Among the reasons Jentleson cites: • The Reagan administration took Iraq off the state terrorist list and the Bush administration kept it off -- but Hussein kept supporting terrorism; • Hussein brazenly and repeatedly violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical warfare, used against the Iranians and then against the Iraqi Kurds; • There were numerous intelligence and other warnings about the network Hussein constructed to acquire high technology and equipment for the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and • Hussein accused the United States of seeking to "govern" the Persian Gulf, called on "good" Arabs to oppose U.S. influences in the region and demanded withdrawal by the U.S. "occupying naval forces" -- the same naval forces that had aided his war against Iran less than two years earlier. Irrespective of the military success in the Gulf War that followed, the author noted there are important lessons to be learned about the way the war occurred -- foreign policy lessons that must be understood as the United States charts it course in the post-Cold War world. "Far from a 'new world order,' this is a world in which regional balances of power are highly unstable and in which the roster of better-armed rogue states grows longer," Jentleson said. "In such a world, the U.S. needs to choose friends carefully and strike alliances strategically. As the U.S.-Iraq case shows, there is nothing automatic about the enemies of enemies becoming friends." In 1993-94 Jentleson served in the Clinton administration as special assistant to the director of the State Department's policy planning staff and as a member of one of the Middle East peace process negotiating teams. In addition to his State Department appointment, Jentleson also served as foreign policy adviser to then-Senator Al Gore in 1987 and 1992. He is the author and editor of three books and numerous articles on U.S. foreign policy and has been the recipient of many awards and fellowships. He holds a Ph.D. from Cornell University and a master's from the London School of Economics and Political Science. The 300-page book is published by W.W. Norton & Co. of New York.